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1 Introduction
Tests of foreign exchange market efficiency are typically based on an assessment of uncovered interest
rate parity (UIP). UIP postulates that the expected change in a bilateral exchange rate is equal to the
forward premium, i.e., given that covered interest rate parity holds, it compensates for the interest rate
differential. However, starting with the seminal work by Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Bilson (1981),
and Fama (1984), empirical research provides evidence that the forward rate is a biased estimate of
the future spot rate, finding that the higher interest rate currency tends to not depreciate as much as
predicted by UIP or even appreciates. A consequence of the empirical failure of UIP is that foreign
exchange excess returns appear to be predictable, i.e. the lagged forward premium has explanatory
power for subsequent excess returns. Attempts to explain this ‘forward bias puzzle’ using, among
others, risk-premia, consumption-based asset pricing theories, and term-structure models have met
with limited success.
While exchange rate anomalies are usually considered to be macro puzzles, the results of recent
research suggest to take a look under the microstructure lamppost. Evans and Lyons (2002) argue
that order-flow conveys information that is relevant to the determination of exchange rates and present
empirical evidence strongly supporting their point. The finding that order-flow drives exchange rates
suggests that scrutinizing the trading behavior of market participants who generate order-flow may
offer deeper insight into the nature of exchange rate puzzles. Lyons (2001) builds on that idea and
argues that the forward bias and the predictability of excess returns might be statistically significant
but nevertheless unimportant in economic terms due to limits to speculation: compared to other
investment opportunities, the Sharpe ratios realizable from currency speculation are too small to
attract traders’ capital. This presumption that traders allocate capital only if Sharpe ratios exceed
a certain threshold implies a range of trader inaction for smaller UIP deviations. Within this range,
traders do not produce order-flow aimed at exploiting the forward bias which, as a consequence,
remains persistent. Empirical research suggests that bilateral exchange rates are characterized by a
statistically persistent but economically small forward bias, see Sarno et al. (2006), thus being in line
with the general idea of limits to speculation. However, Della Corte et al. (2008) show that dynamic
multi-currency strategies yield large economic gains which is consistent with the widespread use of
forward bias strategies among market professionals.
The present paper formalizes the Lyons (2001) concept of the trader inaction range as a device to
assess the economic value of currency speculation. For this purpose, we take a two-step approach. First,
we formulate speculative pendants to the standard UIP test to examine whether currency speculation
yields non-zero profits. Second, we judge the economic significance of resulting Sharpe ratios via
trader inaction ranges implied by limits to speculation. The exchange rate dynamics implied by
speculative UIP suggest that exchange rate changes indeed just follow the forward premium but
additionally comprise a time-varying risk component which depends on the deviation of the current
forward premium from its long-run mean. We show that the forward bias puzzle reported in previous
research stems from omitting this risk-premium in standard UIP tests. Furthermore, the use of carry-
trades aimed at exploiting the forward bias can be rationalized in the presence of such a risk-premium,
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which is consistent with the carry-trade’s huge popularity among market participants. We also show
that an assessment of economic value within the Fama-regression framework necessitates to take a
close look at the regression constant. While research assessing the statistical significance of UIP
deviations heavily focuses on the Fama-regression slope coefficient, disregarding the intercept leads
to overestimating currency excess returns and consequently to spurious conclusions with respect to
economic value.
Empirically, we find support for speculative UIP and the existence of a risk-premium, the omission
of which results in the forward bias puzzle. Carry-traders are able to collect risk-premia and to generate
positive excess returns. Whereas the economic value of these excess returns is limited for bilateral carry-
trades, we provide evidence that portfolio strategies involving multiple currencies indeed generate
economic value. Furthermore, the results of our empirical analysis also support our emphasis to
explicitly account for the regression intercept when judging the economic value of currency speculation.
Our paper is thus closely related to Della Corte et al. (2008) who also find that multi-currency
strategies generate economic value. While their focus rests more on the design of the dynamic asset
allocation strategy, our work goes beyond their analysis in that we show (i) that exchange rate returns
comprise a time-varying risk-premium, (ii) how carry-traders are able to collect this risk-premium,
thereby providing a direct rationale for the strategy, and (iii) that the forward bias puzzle originates
from the omission of the risk-premium in standard UIP tests. Furthermore, a particularly nice feature
of our framework is that it can be directly applied to the standard Fama-regression setup. Hence, it
equips the large research community working on related studies with an effective testing procedure
which is straight-forward in its implementation and provides material information about the economic
relevance of UIP deviations. Moreover, we discuss various directions in which one can extend the
analysis of our paper in future research.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We briefly review the related literature in
section 2 and provide a short outline of our framework in section 3. In section 4 we derive the
speculative pendants to the standard UIP test and describe the exchange rate dynamics implied by
speculative UIP. We derive trader inaction ranges to judge economic value in section 5. Empirical
results, their implications, and extensions for future research are presented in section 6. Section 7
offers a conclusion. All tables and figures are gathered at the end of the paper. The separate appendix
is organized as follows: Appendix A. generalizes the derivation of section 4 by additionally allowing for
an unconditional (country) risk-premium. Appendix B. provides technical details with respect to the
derivation of trader inaction ranges, Appendix C. describes the procedure for testing whether inaction
range bounds are over- or undershot.
2 Related Literature on UIP and Currency Speculation
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) postulates that the expected exchange rate change compensates for
the interest rate differential prevailing for the respective countries. Given that covered interest parity
holds, the interest rate differential equals the forward premium. A standard test of UIP is the Fama
3
(1984) regression,
∆st+1 = α+ βp1t + εt+1 (1)
where st denotes the logarithm of the spot exchange rate (domestic price of foreign currency) at time
t, p1t the one-period forward premium, i.e. f
1
t − st with f1t being the logarithm of the one-period
forward rate, and ∆ a one-period change. The null hypothesis that UIP holds is represented by α
being zero and β equalling unity. The common finding that empirical research over the last decades
provided and concentrated on is that β is typically lower than unity and often negative. This indicates
that the higher interest rate currency tends to not depreciate as much as predicted by UIP or even
appreciates, apparently allowing for predictable excess returns over UIP. Seminal articles in this area
are Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Bilson (1981), and Fama (1984), surveys of the literature include
Hodrick (1987), Froot and Thaler (1990), Taylor (1995), Lewis (1995), Engel (1996), Sarno (2005).
Fama (1984) argues that the forward bias may be caused by a time-varying risk-premium that
is more volatile than, and negatively correlated with, the expected rate of currency depreciation.
However, traditional risk-based explanations have in general had limited success in explaining the
observed linkages between exchange rates and interest rates; see e.g. Bekaert and Hodrick (1993) and
Bekaert and Hodrick (2001). In particular, attempts to explain the forward bias puzzle using models
of risk-premia suggest that unrealistically high degrees of risk aversion must be assumed to match the
two Fama (1984) conditions; see e.g. Frankel and Engel (1984); Domowitz and Hakkio (1985); Cumby
(1988); Mark (1988); Engel (1996); Lustig and Verdelhan (2007). Moreover, it is difficult to explain the
rejection of UIP and the forward bias puzzle by recourse to traditional consumption-based asset pricing
theories which allow for departures from time-additive preferences (Backus et al., 1993; Bansal et al.,
1995; Bekaert, 1996) and from expected utility (Bekaert et al., 1997), or by using popular models of
the term structure of interest rates adapted to a multi-currency setting (Bansal, 1997; Backus et al.,
2001; Brennan and Xia, 2006). More recently, Verdelhan (2008) offers an explanation to the puzzle
based on a model in which investors have preferences with external habits. Brunnermeier et al. (2008),
Farhi and Gabaix (2008), and Jurek (2008) argue that currency (excess) returns comprise a premium
for crash risk.
While exchange rate anomalies are usually considered to be macro puzzles, the results of recent
research suggest to take a look under the microstructure lamppost. Evans and Lyons (2002) argue
that order-flow conveys information that is relevant to the determination of exchange rates and present
empirical evidence strongly supporting their point.1 The finding that order-flow drives exchange rates
suggests that scrutinizing the trading behavior of market participants who generate order-flow may
offer deeper insight into the nature of exchange rate puzzles. Lyons (2001) builds on that idea and
suggests a microstructural approach building on institutional realities: Traders only allocate capital to
currency speculation if they expect a higher Sharpe ratio than from other investment opportunities,
i.e. some threshold in terms of the Sharpe ratio has to be exceeded.2 Lyons (2001) argues that returns
1Other papers emphasizing the role of order-flow in foreigen exchange markets include, among others,
Lyons (1995), Ito et al. (1998), Rime (2001), Lyons (2002), Evans and Lyons (2004), Bjønnes and Rime (2005),
Dominguez and Panthaki (2006), Evans and Lyons (2006), Taylor and Sager (2008), Rime et al. (2008).
2Lyons (2001) stresses that speculative capital is allocated based on Sharpe ratios in practice. This empirical reality
is important for his concept rather than a theoretical rational for why such a behavior arises.
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from currency speculation depend on how far β deviates from unity. For minor UIP deviations, Sharpe
ratios are too small to attract speculative capital, thereby implying a range of trader inaction in the
vicinity of UIP. Lyons (2001) states that βs around -1 or 3 are necessary to achieve a Sharpe ratio
of 0.4, the long run performance of a buy-and-hold strategy in US equities. Accordingly, he suggests
that a range of β-values between approximately -1 and 3 characterizes a trader inaction band, within
which β might be statistically different from unity but without economic relevance.
Inspired by the concept of limits to speculation, Sarno et al. (2006) investigate the relationship
between spot and forward rates in a smooth transition regression framework. They report evidence
for such a non-linear relationship, allowing for a time-varying forward bias. The empirical results
indicate that UIP does not hold most of the time but (expected) deviations from UIP are economically
insignificant, i.e. too small to attract speculative capital. Burnside et al. (2006) argue that transaction
costs and price pressure limit the extent to which traders try to exploit the anomaly. Real world
market evidence, however, suggests that the carry-trade strategy aimed at exploiting the forward
bias is highly popular among financial institutions and extensively used in practice. For instance,
Galati and Melvin (2004) and Galati et al. (2007) argue that the use of carry-trades is a key driver for
the surge of foreign exchange trading activity in recent years. Villanueva (2007) provides evidence that
the forward premium allows for directional predictability which translates into statistically significant
profits from trading on the forward bias. Della Corte et al. (2008) find that conditioning on the forward
premium produces economic value in multi-currency portfolios. In particular, they show that a risk-
averse investor will pay a high performance fee to switch from a dynamic portfolio strategy based
on the random walk model to one that conditions on the forward premium. Related, Burnside et al.
(2008) show that diversifying the carry-trade across currencies boosts Sharpe ratios by over 50%.
Hochradl and Wagner (2008) argue that carry-trade portfolios have the potential to attract speculative
capital as they outperform benchmark stock- and bond-index investments. In this paper, we formalize
the concept of the trader inaction range, which allows us to derive the dynamics of currency speculation,
to analyze their linkage to risk-premia, and to assess the economic value attainable.
3 Outline of the Framework
Instead of investigating the efficiency of currency markets by standard UIP tests, we assess the economic
value of currency speculation.3 We build on Lyons (2001) who argues that deviations of the Fama-
regression β form its UIP-theoretic value may not be important in economic terms as long as deviations
are too small to attract speculative capital. We extend his logic to the regression constant α and argue
that for UIP in a speculative sense α and β do not always have to correspond to their standardly
hypothesized values but rather that deviations of one or both might occur as long as these do not
allow for economically significant profits.
By economic significance we mean that finding excess returns to be statistically different from
zero, is not sufficient in economic terms. Profits can be strictly positive but still too small to attract
3While we are quite general in our nomenclature, we will particularly focus on trading strategies on the basis of
interest rate differential information.
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capital. Traders compare currency speculation approaches to other investment opportunities, e.g. a
buy-and-hold equity investment, and speculative capital would only be allocated to currency strategies
offering a higher Sharpe ratio than other investments. Otherwise, no capital would be allocated, thus
no order flow produced, and hence the bias be left unexploited and persistent, being visible statistically
but without economic relevance.
We therefore take a two-step approach to assess the economic value of currency speculation. First,
we formulate speculative pendants to the standard UIP test, to examine whether currency speculation
yields non-zero profits. If profits are statistically different from zero, we judge the economic significance
of resulting Sharpe ratios via trader inaction ranges implied by limits to speculation. We provide a
formalization of the idea verbally described by Lyons (2001) which also goes beyond the analysis of
Sarno et al. (2006), as we derive trader inaction ranges analytically. This does not only allow us
to empirically test the predictions of the limits to speculation hypothesis that currency speculation
should not generate economic value, but also to analyze the dynamics of currency speculation and
their linkage to risk-premia.
4 Speculative UIP, Risk-Premia, and Dynamics of Speculation
Starting from a static trading approach, i.e. a permanent long (or short) position in the foreign
currency, which can be viewed as a lower benchmark for speculative efficiency, we motivate a speculative
UIP test on the Fama-regression. Speculative UIP implies that exchange rate dynamics comprise a
time-varying risk-premium and we show that its omission in standard UIP tests causes the forward
bias puzzle. We propose a test for this risk-premium and outline the dynamics of excess returns from
the static trading approach as well as the carry-trade.
4.1 Static Trading Approach: Risk-Premia and Excess Return Dynamics
Building on the argument of Lyons (2001) that traders use Sharpe ratios to evaluate the performance
of their trading strategies, it is instructive to reparametrize the regression in equation (1) in terms of
excess returns. We use the standard definition of excess returns given by the difference between the
exchange rate return and the lagged premium, see e.g. Bilson (1981), Fama (1984), and Backus et al.
(1993), Sarno et al. (2006), ERt+1 ≡ ∆st+1 − p1t ≡ st+1 − f1t , yields
ERt+1 = α+ (β − 1) p1t + εt+1, (2)
where ERt+1 corresponds to the payoff of a long forward position in the foreign currency entered
at time t and maturing at t + 1. Analogously, −ERt+1 corresponds to a short position.4 Market
efficiency arguments suggest that in the long-run excess returns should be zero on average. Given that
the domestic and the foreign interest rates are stationary, the forward premium reverts to a long-run
4Equivalently, one could enter corresponding spot market and money market transactions.
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mean which we denote by µp.5 The long-run average of excess returns, ER, can then be written as
ER = α+ (β − 1)µp. (3)
Note that, since the Fama-regression is usually estimated by OLS, by the least squares principle the
average residual is zero because the regression includes a constant. The standard procedure to assess
whether UIP holds is to test the restrictions α = 0 and β = 1 which implies that ER = 0. If one
relaxes the assumption of risk-neutrality, the average excess return should reflect an unconditional risk-
premium depending on the riskiness of the foreign currency held. The sign of the premium depends on
whether holding the foreign currency as compared to the domestic currency is associated with more
risk (e.g. political risk, transition effects) or less (e.g. foreign country is a “safe haven”). For the ease
of presentation, we discuss the case where the unconditional risk-premium is zero below, analogous
derivations for a non-zero country risk-premium are provided in Appendix A..
Given that holding the currencies of the two countries is equally risky, the average excess return
should be zero. Taking a speculative efficiency perspective, one notes that an average excess return of
zero does not only result if α and β exactly correspond to these theoretical values but for any values
that satisfy the less restrictive relationship α = −(β − 1)µp. Hence, both parameters might deviate
from their hypothesized values but still not allow for a non-zero average excess return. In fact, this
illustrates that if one of the parameters deviates from its theoretical value, the other one should do so
as well such that the average excess return growing with the deviation of the one parameter is reduced
by an opposing deviation of the other one. In our empirical analysis we formally test for the existence
of such offsetting effects which is equivalent to testing whether average profits from the static trading
approach are zero. Since previous research usually reports tests on whether β = 1, we formulate our
test in terms of β as well, proposing
Test 1 (Speculative UIP Test): For the parameters of the Fama-regression (1), we test the
hypothesis β = 1− α/µp. If this restriction holds, offsetting effects between α and β exist and average
excess returns from the static trading approach are zero.
For the subsequent derivation we conjecture that the relationship β = 1 − α/µp holds, i.e. we
conjecture a minimum level of speculative efficiency. Otherwise, non-zero excess returns could be
generated in the long-run - even though the unconditional country risk-premium is zero - just by
taking a permanent long or short position in the foreign currency. Imposing the restriction on the
Fama-regression (1) yields
∆st+1 = α− αp
1
t
µp
+ p1t + εt+1 (4)
and rewriting the excess return equation (2) gives
ERt+1 = α− αp
1
t
µp
+ εt+1. (5)
5We consciously leave interest rate modeling outside the scope of this paper. For the purpose of motivating our
arguments it is sufficient to build on the theoretical and empirical results of previous work that interest rates are mean
reverting. We take up this issue again in section 6.3 where we discuss potential extensions to our framework.
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The spot rate dynamics as given in (4) can be described as follows: the core movement in the change
of the exchange rate corresponds just to the forward premium, p1t , as postulated by UIP. Additionally,
∆st+1 is driven by a constant term, α, and a component, −α p
1
t
µp
, that is governed by the extent to
which the forward premium at t deviates from its long-run mean. Hence, our dynamics suggest that
temporary deviations from UIP are possible, but in the long-run reversion towards the parity condi-
tion occurs. Note that this specification is consistent with other exchange rate modeling approaches
established in the literature such as regime switching models, e.g. Engel and Hamilton (1990), vector
error correction models, see e.g. Brenner and Kroner (1995), Zivot (2000), and Clarida et al. (2003),
and smooth transition regression frameworks recently applied by e.g. Sarno et al. (2006). In this con-
text, α plays a role in determining the reversion to long-run UIP. Defining α = α/µp we can rewrite
equations (4) and (5) as
∆st+1 = α
(
µp − p1t
)
+ p1t + εt+1,
ERt+1 = α
(
µp − p1t
)
+ εt+1
(6)
where α should be positive, i.e. α should have the same sign as µp, to ensure expedient convergence to
long-run UIP. This, however, suggests that over shorter horizons deviations from UIP occur and that
excess returns represent a time-varying risk-premium.
Given that the exchange rate process is indeed governed as represented in (4), estimating the
Fama-regression (1) leads to a biased estimate of β due to the omission of −α p1tµp :
E [β] = βUIP − α
{
cov
[
p1t ; p
1
t /µp
]
σ2p
}
= 1− α
{
1
µp
}
. (7)
As argued above for equation (6), α and µp should have the same sign to ensure a proper reversion
towards long-run UIP. This suggests that the slope coefficient in the Fama-regression will be biased
downwards from its theoretical UIP value, βUIP = 1, which is consistent with empirical research
documenting the forward bias puzzle. Hence, our results contribute to the literature attempting to
explain the puzzle by recourse to risk-premium arguments, for a survey see e.g. Engel (1996), and are
in line with research suggesting that standard UIP tests may be non-informative in the presence of an
omitted risk-premium, see e.g. Barnhart et al. (1999). Our empirical analysis is based on equation (5)
for which we present unrestricted estimates as given by
ERt+1 = α1 + α2
p1t
µp
+ εt+1. (8)
The attempt to explain the forward bias puzzle by recourse to risk-premium arguments is supported
if α2 is significantly different from zero and if one cannot reject that α1 = −α2. Note that the latter is
ensured if one finds evidence for offsetting effects between α and β (Test 1); finding α1 6= −α2 would
be indicative for the presence of a non-zero country risk-premium, see Appendix A.. Accordingly, we
formulate
Test 2 (Risk-Premium Test): For the parameters of regression (8), we test the hypotheses
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α2 = 0 and α1 = −α2. If the former restriction is rejected and the latter holds, a non-zero risk-
premium exists.
If a non-zero risk-premium exits, the (long-run) dynamics of excess returns from the static trading
approach can be described by enumerating all possible scenarios. Although we provided a rationale
above that we expect β < 1 in the long-run, we also present scenarios where β > 1 since we refer to
these scenarios in the next subsection. Overall, the excess return process can be summarized in 12
scenarios which depend on the sign of µp, the relation between p1t and µp and the combination of β
and α values:
µp > 0
β < 1, α > 0 β > 1, α < 0
0 < µp < p1t ERt+1 < 0 ERt+1 > 0 [1a, 1b]
0 < p1t < µp ERt+1 > 0 ERt+1 < 0 [2a, 2b]
p1t < 0 < µp ERt+1 > 0 ERt+1 < 0 [3a, 3b]
µp < 0
β < 1, α < 0 β > 1, α > 0
µp < 0 < p1t ERt+1 < 0 ERt+1 > 0 [4a, 4b]
µp < p
1
t < 0 ERt+1 < 0 ERt+1 > 0 [5a, 5b]
p1t < µp < 0 ERt+1 > 0 ERt+1 < 0 [6a, 6b]
(9)
A “perfect” speculation strategy would take long and short positions such as to always realize
positive excess returns, which requires perfect knowledge or foresight of the long-run forward premium
µp. This is consistent with the literature showing that the term-structure of forward premia, contains
useful information for predicting exchange rates; see e.g. Clarida and Taylor (1997), Clarida et al.
(2003), and Boudoukh et al. (2006). In practice, market participants often use simpler trading rules
like the carry-trade described in the next subsection.
4.2 Exploiting the Forward Bias: Carry-Trade
The empirical evidence that the Fama-β is typically negative has of course also been recognized by
practicioners and motivated the design of trading rules attempting to exploit the forward bias; see
e.g. Deutsche Bank (2004). Carry-trade strategies - take a long position in the higher interest rate
currency, financed by a short position in the low interest rate currency - are highly popular among
market participants; see e.g. Galati and Melvin (2004), Galati et al. (2007).
The excess return from a bilateral carry-trade can be written in terms of ERt+1 introduced in (2):
one would sell forward the foreign currency at time t if p1t > 0 and realize a payoff of −ERt+1 at t+1;
a long position is entered if p1t < 0, yielding a payoff of ERt+1 :
CTt+1 =
 ERt+1 = α+ (β − 1) p1t + εt+1 if p1t < 0,−ERt+1 = −α− (β − 1) p1t − εt+1 if p1t > 0. (10)
It is instructive to reconcile this representation of carry-trade profits with the excess return dynamics
of the static trading approach outlined in the previous section by summarizing the dynamics of carry-
trade profits:
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µp > 0
β < 1, α > 0 β > 1, α < 0
0 < µp < p1t ERt+1 < 0 CTt+1 > 0 ERt+1 > 0 CTt+1 < 0 [1a, 1b]
0 < p1t < µp ERt+1 > 0 CTt+1 < 0 ERt+1 < 0 CTt+1 > 0 [2a, 2b]
p1t < 0 < µp ERt+1 > 0 CTt+1 > 0 ERt+1 < 0 CTt+1 < 0 [3a, 3b]
µp < 0
β < 1, α < 0 β > 1, α > 0
µp < 0 < p1t ERt+1 < 0 CTt+1 > 0 ERt+1 > 0 CTt+1 < 0 [4a, 4b]
µp < p
1
t < 0 ERt+1 < 0 CTt+1 < 0 ERt+1 > 0 CTt+1 > 0 [5a, 5b]
p1t < µp < 0 ERt+1 > 0 CTt+1 > 0 ERt+1 < 0 CTt+1 < 0 [6a, 6b]
(11)
Although carry-trades are motivated by the intention to profit from β less than unity, positive
excess returns only emerge in four out of six scenarios where β < 1. While a loss is incurred in
scenarios 2a and 5a although β < 1, carry-trades are profitable in scenarios 2b and 5b even though
β > 1. We discuss the pitfalls of exclusively focusing on β and neglecting offsetting effects of α in
section 4.3. Nevertheless, since we argued in the previous subsection that β should be less than unity,
the use of carry-trade strategies can be rationalized as it successfully captures risk-premia in most
scenarios. In particular, it can be viewed as a proxy to the prefect foresight strategy as it conditions
on p1t but not on µp.
In order to formulate a test of zero-profitability of carry-trades we rewrite equation (10). Since
the sign of the position taken in the foreign currency is opposite to the sign of the forward premium,
i.e. long if p1t < 0 respectively short if p
1
t > 0, we adjust the parameters and residuals of the Fama-
regression accordingly. To indicate that a component i of the regression is adjusted for the position
taken, we use superscript ′, with i′ = −sgn [p1t ] i. Hence, the excess return from the carry-trade can
be written as
CTt+1 = ER′t+1 = α
′ + (β − 1) (p1t )′ + ε′t+1,
CT = α′ + (β − 1) p′ + ε′.
(12)
Note that, if over the investigated period the sign of the premium changes at least once, α′ is not a
constant and the mean of ε′t+1 is non-zero. Therefore, the means of α′, (p1t )′, and ε′t+1 are components
of the average carry-trade excess return CT . Excess returns from the carry-trade are not significantly
different from zero if the restriction β = 1− (α′ + ε′)/p′ holds on the parameters in regression (1).
Test 3 (Carry-Trade Zero Profit Test): For the parameters of the Fama-regression (1), we test
the hypothesis β = 1− (α′+ε′)/p′. If this restriction holds, average excess returns from the carry-trade
are zero.
In the derivation of the trader inaction ranges to judge the economic value of carry-trade speculation
as well as in our empirical analysis, we also consider carry-trade portfolios.
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4.3 The Pitfalls of Exclusively Focusing on β
The Fama-regression (1) assesses market efficiency as a joint test of rational expectations and risk-
neutrality. While rational expectations imply that β = 1 and that the forecast error (εt+1) is un-
correlated with information at t, risk-neutrality suggests that α = 0. A non-zero α would represent
a constant risk-premium. Hundreds of studies have estimated the Fama-regression for different ex-
change rates and sample periods with the focus of discussion always directed towards β. Hodrick (1992)
cautioned that interpreting the negative β as evidence that the forward premium mispredicts the di-
rection of subsequent exchange rate returns may be misleading because authors ignore the constant
even though it is relatively large. Similarly, Bekaert and Hodrick (2009) point out in their textbook
(Chapter 7, p. 239) that people familiar with the regression result of a negative slope coefficient
“[...] argue that investors should do the “carry-trade” - that is, borrow in the foreign
currency to earn both the higher yield and the expected capital appreciation of the dollar
implied by the regression. Unfortunately, this interpretation of the regression is wrong
because it ignores the value of the constant term.”
Nonetheless, the relevance of α has remained under-researched to date, and we are not aware of a
paper that investigates the role of the constant in more detail or provides an interpretation for the
estimates of α.
Our motivation for speculative UIP in section 4.1 suggests that one should look beyond the question
of whether the slope coefficient equals unity and also consider the intercept. We argued that offsetting
effects between α and β should exist and motivated to test whether β = 1−α/µp which corresponds to
zero-profits from static trading positions in the foreign currency. Given that the hypothesized offsetting
effects exist, exclusively focusing on β leads to misestimation of profits generable from static foreign
currency positions: excess returns, ER, will be overestimated (in absolute terms) due to neglecting
the offsetting effect by α.
Analogously, the assessment of carry-trade profitability might be spurious if the null of the spec-
ulative UIP test holds. If - as expected by carry-traders - β < 1, the following can be said for CT :
since p′ < 0 it follows from β < 1 that (β − 1)p′ > 0 but also that α′ < 0, again highlighting the
offsetting effects. Thus, one generates profits from β being lower than unity, but profits are eroded
by the constant, sometimes even leading to a loss despite β < 1 (scenarios 2a and 5a). If β > 1 the
reverse is true, but it is not necessarily the case that one makes a loss even though the strategy is
motivated by trading on a β < 1 (scenarios 2b and 5b). Considering β only, may lead to a spurious
appraisal of carry-trade profitability and in particular to an overestimation of profits if β < 1.
In general, disregarding α distorts the assessment of zero-profitability of currency speculation.
Consequently, as shown in the next section, also the judgment of economic value based on trader
inaction ranges will be distorted.
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5 Assessment of Economic Value by Trader Inaction Ranges
To assess the economic significance of excess returns we derive trader inaction ranges implied by limits
to speculation. First, we directly follow Lyons (2001), subsequently we derive the inaction range bounds
for the static trading approach and the carry-trade. We show for both strategies that disregarding α
leads to overestimation of excess returns and potentially to spurious conclusions about the economic
value of currency speculation.
5.1 Inaction Range as Motivated by Lyons (2001)
In this subsection we derive the trader inaction range following the verbal description of Lyons (2001),
suggesting that excess returns and hence Sharpe ratios realizable from UIP deviations solely depend on
β; he does neither consider the effect of α on excess returns nor the impact of β on the standard devia-
tion of profits. For a given forward premium, Sharpe ratios increase as β deviates from unity. Traders
only allocate speculative capital to currency strategies if Sharpe ratios exceed a certain threshold (as
e.g. given by the long run performance of a buy-and-hold equity investment), implying that β needs
to deviate correspondingly far from unity to generate order flow. This logic suggests a range of trader
inaction for βs close to unity while capital could only be attracted if β over- respectively undershoots
the bounds of this range. In the following, we derive the inaction range bounds; some technical details
are provided in appendix B.1.
Based on the excess return defined in equation (2), we present the Sharpe ratio and the corre-
sponding trader inaction range only considering β but disregarding α, i.e. presuming α = 0. However,
we account for β when calculating the standard deviation of ERt+1. The variance of excess returns is
given by
σ2ER = (β − 1)2σ2p + σ2ε + 2(β − 1)covp,ε (13)
with σ denoting the standard deviations and covp,ε the covariance of p and ε. If the Fama-regression
parameters are estimated by OLS, the residuals are orthogonal to the premium by assumption, i.e.
covp,ε = 0. Setting α = 0 and combining equations (2) and (13), the Sharpe ratio can be written as
SRER,α=0 =
(β − 1)µp√
(β − 1)2σ2p + σ2ε
. (14)
The numerator changes in proportion to µp as β deviates from unity. However, β also enters the
denominator and the standard deviation increases as β deviates from unity. Thus, for increasing
deviations of β, the Sharpe ratio changes monotonically but only at a decreasing rate, and therefore,
from a pure mathematical point of view, one could say that speculation is limited since the Sharpe
ratio is bounded. It is an empirical matter whether the limiting Sharpe ratios as well as the associated
βs are economically reasonable.
From equation (14) one can derive the trader inaction range in terms of β, i.e. the βs necessary
to achieve a certain Sharpe ratio threshold, SRth, by rearranging and solving the resulting quadratic
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equation,
β [SRth, α = 0] =
±SRthσε√(
µ2p − SR2thσ2p
) + 1. (15)
The β for which the Sharpe ratio is zero, the center of the inaction range, βc[0, α = 0], is unity and
therefore corresponds to the standardly hypothesized UIP value. Around this center, the upper and
lower bound are symmetric, as suggested by Lyons (2001), with the width of the range increasing
overproportionally with the Sharpe ratio threshold. Note that for very small |µp| extremely large
Sharpe ratio thresholds may be necessary to define the bounds, or put differently, a given SRth might
be unreachable high.
5.2 Inaction Range for the Static Trading Approach
We now take the impact of α on excess returns explicitly into account as given in equation (2). Some
technical details are provided in appendix B.2. The standard deviation can be taken from equation
(13) since α as a constant has no impact on the variance. The Sharpe ratio therefore is
SRER =
α+ (β − 1) p√
(β − 1)2σ2p + σ2ε
. (16)
Compared to presuming α = 0, a non-zero α affects the Sharpe ratio by a change proportional to
the standard deviation. Given that offsetting effects between α and (β − 1)µp exist, the Sharpe
ratios implied by equation (16) will be lower than those from equation (14) where α was set to zero.
Furthermore, the Sharpe ratio is not a monotonic function of β anymore; while the Sharpe ratio is still
bounded (with the same limits), the Sharpe ratio does not converge to its extremes with β approaching
plus or minus infinity, rather the global optimum occurs when β = (µpσε)/(ασp) + 1.
For a given Sharpe ratio threshold, SRth, the respective β-bounds of the inaction range can be
calculated from rearranging equation (16) and solving the resulting quadratic equation. The bounds
are given by
β [SRth, α] =
−αµp ± SRth
√
α2σ2p + σ2ε
(
µ2p − SR2thσ2p
)
µ2p − SR2thσ2p
+ 1. (17)
The center of the inaction range, i.e. the β resulting in a Sharpe ratio of zero, corresponds to the
β-value hypothesized in the speculative UIP test (Test 1) assessing the profitability of static foreign
currency positions: βc[0, α] = 1 − α/µp. Hence, for non-zero values of α, the inaction range is not
centered around unity and, furthermore, the bounds are not symmetric around βc[0, α]. There might
also be situations in which the Sharpe ratio threshold is unreachable high, resulting in the inaction
range to be undefined.
Comparing the bounds derived with α = 0 to those derived using the Fama-α, a misinterpretation
of economic significance might arise due to the fact that the former differ from the latter in terms
of the level of the inaction range (different centers) as well with respect to its shape (symmetric vs.
asymmetric). Accordingly, we formulate the following prediction.
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Prediction 1: Disregarding α leads to overestimation of excess returns and consequently to inaccurate
trader inaction ranges for the static trading approach. If offsetting effects between α and β exist (Test
1), the economic value generated by the static trading approach is overstated.
5.3 Inaction Range for the Carry-Trade
The excess return from the carry-trade was presented in equation (12), the corresponding variance is
given by
σ2CT = σ
2
α′ + (β − 1)2 σ2p′ + σ2ε′ + 2(β − 1)covα′,p′ + 2covα′,ε′ + 2(β − 1)covp′,ε′ . (18)
Note that if the sign of the premium changes at least once, α′ is not a constant and therefore also
affects the standard deviation of carry-trade returns. Furthermore, the covariances can be different
from, although will typically be close to, zero. The Sharpe ratio of the carry-trade is given by SRCT =
CT/σCT .
The bounds of the carry-trade inaction range for a given Sharpe ratio threshold can be calculated from
rearranging SRCT and solving the following quadratic equation:
(β − 1)2
{
p′2 − SR2thσ2p′
}
+ (β − 1)
{
2
(
α′p′ + p′ε′ − SR2th
(
covα′,p′ + covp′,ε′
) )}
+
{
α′2 + ε′2 + 2α′ε′ − SR2th
(
σ2α′ + σ
2
ε′ + 2covα′,ε′
)}
.
(19)
The center of the inaction range is given by βc [0, α] = 1 − (α′ + ε′)/p′, corresponding to the value
hypothesized in Test 3 for assessing whether the carry-trade yields non-zero profits. Note that the
center of the range can be different from unity even if α = 0. Analogously to the inaction range derived
for the static approach, the bounds can be asymmetric.
Disregarding α by presuming the constant, and thereby also the corresponding covariances, to
be zero, again affects the judgement of economic significance. The centers of the respective inaction
ranges differ by βc[0, α]−βc[0, α = 0] = −α′/p′. If offsetting effects between α and (β−1)µp exist, one
finds that βc[0, α] < βc[0, α = 0] if β < 1 and βc[0, α] > βc[0, α = 0] if β > 1. Given our arguments and
previous empirical evidence that β is typically less than unity, neglecting α potentially results in an
inaction range on a too high level and spurious indication of economic significance. Furthermore, the
inaction range accounting for α is wider than the range based on α = 0; the magnitude of this effect
depends on how often α′ changes signs. Based on these arguments we state the following prediction.
Prediction 2: If β < 1, disregarding α leads to an overestimation of carry-trade profits, underesti-
mation of their variance, and consequently to inaccurate trader inaction ranges. If offsetting effects
between α and β exist (Test 1), the economic value generated by carry-trades is overstated.
In addition to bilateral carry-trades, we also assess the economic value yielded by carry-trade
portfolios. The first portfolio is an equally-weighted combination of bilateral carry-trades, the second
maximizes the Sharpe ratio. When generating expected excess returns as inputs for the latter, we aim
at mimicing market participants’ behavior to condition their carry-trade investment decisions on the
forward premium only. A consistent way of doing so is to assume that the exchange rate follows a
14
random-walk without drift, implying that its expected change is zero, resulting in the expected excess
return being equal to minus the forward premium. The portfolio is rebalanced every month. With
respect to estimation, we consider a pooled regression framework and a fixed effects model. The excess
returns, standard deviations, and inaction range bounds can be calculated as described for the bilateral
carry-trade above: for a portfolio covering a spectrum of i = 1, ..., N foreign currencies with weights
ωi, equation (12) is applied with α′ =
∑N
i=1 ωiα
′
i, (p
1
t )
′ =
∑N
i=1 ωi(p
1
t )
′
i, and ε
′ =
∑N
i=1 ωiε
′
i.
6
6 Empirical Analysis
For our empirical analysis we use monthly spot exchange rates and one-month forward premia provided
by the Bank for International Settlements. The exchange rates considered are the US Dollar versus
the Canadian Dollar (CAD), Swiss Franc (CHF), British Pound (GBP), Japanese Yen (JPY), Danish
Krone (DKK), and German Mark (DEM) which is replaced by the Euro (EUR) from 1999 onwards.
For the combined DEM-EUR series the data covers the period from December 1978 to September
2008, for all other currencies September 1977 to September 2008. As the sample stretches out into the
current financial market crisis, we frequently compare full-sample results to results based only on data
until the end of 2005 in section 6.1. Further robustness checks are provided in section 6.2, section 6.3
briefly summarizes our results and discusses potential routes for future research.
6.1 Results
6.1.1 Speculative UIP, Risk-Premia, and Dynamics of Speculation
The first rows of Table 1 display the results of the Fama-regression (1) as commonly reported in
previous literature. α and β are the parameter estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors in parentheses; standard errors are calculated following Newey and West
(1987). All estimates of β are negative, and β = 1 is rejected at the 1 percent level for all currencies.
Evidence is mixed for the hypothesis α = 0: while it cannot be rejected for CAD and DEM-EUR, it
is rejected at the 10 percent level for GBP (p-value is 0.0797), at the 5 percent level for the CHF, and
at the 1 percent level for the JPY. The joint hypothesis that α = 0 and β = 1 is rejected at least at
the 5 percent level for all currencies. Thus, consistent with previous research, standard tests do not
support UIP. In contrast, applying Test 1, β = 1−α/µp, to assess whether UIP holds in a speculative
sense, does not reject UIP in a single case. This indicates that the hypothesized offsetting relationship
between α and (β − 1)µp exists, implying that average excess returns are not significantly different
from zero. The offsetting relationship between the two components of the average excess return is also
illustrated in Figure 1 by plotting the extent to which α and (β − 1)µp contribute to average excess
returns in a stacked column diagram. The economic importance of α is indicated by the absolute
magnitude of the component in average excess returns ranging from 31 to 49 percent. Its relevance is
particularly highlighted by the very high t-statistics of testing the null hypothesis that the means of
6Note that for the pooled regression approach αi is the same across all currencies and differences in α
′
i only stem from
the signing by the forward premium, i.e. by the ′, whereas for the fixed effects model the αi differ for each i.
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the (β − 1)p1t series are zero. Hence, excess returns appear significantly non-zero when disregarding α
whereas accounting for α reveals that they are insignificant.
The existence of these offsetting effects forms the basis for the spot rate process as given in equation
(4). The underlying exchange rate dynamics allow for time-varying deviations from UIP and are
consistent with a variety of exchange rate modeling approaches established in the literature; see our
discussion in section 4.1. Our empirical results strongly support that exchange rate changes follow the
forward premium in their core but additionally carry a component that depends on the extent to which
the current forward premium deviates from its long-run mean. All estimates of α2 are significantly
different from zero at the 1 percent level and the restriction of α1 = −α2 cannot be rejected for any
currency. Our results show that the standard - yet, to date, rather unsuccessful - argument that the
forward bias puzzle reported in the literature is caused by an omitted risk-premium is indeed valid.
Assessing the profitability of carry-trade excess returns as proposed in Test 3, reveals mixed evi-
dence: excess returns are significantly different from zero for CAD, GBP, and DEM-EUR, while not
so for the CHF and JPY.
The existence of offsetting effects between α and β, as supported by the results of Test 1, allows to
illustrate the dynamics of excess returns from the static trading approach (ER) and the carry-trade
(CT ) by enumerating all possible scenarios which depend on the sign of µp, the relation between p1t and
µp and the combination of β and α values; see sections 4.1 and 4.2. Since the Fama-β estimates are -
consistent with our priors - below unity for all currencies, only scenarios 1a to 6a are relevant. For the
static trading approach, Panel A of Table 2 lists the predicted signs of excess returns for each scenario
in the first column and reports the corresponding realizations in the remaining columns. The results
show that the excess returns are signed as predicted. Furthermore, Panel A reports the performance of
a static long position in the foreign currency as well as corresponding results for the perfect foresight
strategy i.e. the performance if one had knowledge about µp and could therefore perfectly predict
the next period scenario. The performance of the perfect foresight strategy is quite similar across all
currencies with Sharpe ratios ranging from 0.52 to 0.73. In Panel B, analogous results are reported
for the carry-trade. First, we find that the realized excess returns are signed as predicted. Second,
the performance of carry-trades is mixed with Sharpe ratios varying between 0.27 to 0.55. Comparing
these figures to the performance of the perfect foresight strategy underpins that the latter dominates
and that the carry-trade can be viewed as a simple proxy for it. Nevertheless, it also shows that carry-
trades can be rationalized as they successfully collect risk-premia. Also note, that the finding that
the foresight strategy, which is based on information about long-run interest rates, performs better
is consistent with the literature showing that the term-structure of forward premia contains useful
information for predicting exchange rates; see e.g. Clarida and Taylor (1997), Clarida et al. (2003),
and Boudoukh et al. (2006).
6.1.2 Economic Value of Bilateral Currency Speculation
To assess the economic significance of UIP deviations, we report trader inaction ranges for the static
trading approach in Table 3. In a first step, we use the full sample up to September 2008 and derive
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trader inaction ranges based on a Sharpe ratio threshold of 0.5, which Lyons (2001) argues to be
reasonable since the long-run performance of a simple buy-and-hold strategy in US equity is around
0.4.7 The first rows repeat the Fama regression estimates with corresponding Newey and West (1987)
standard errors in square brackets. Next, we report the bounds of the trader inaction range when
disregarding α, i.e. presuming α = 0. βu denotes the upper bound, βc the center, and βl the lower
bound of the inaction range. The values in parentheses are the p-values for testing whether β is below
the upper bound, whether the estimate is equal to the center of the range, and whether β is above
the lower bound. Details of the testing procedure can be found in Appendix C. The inaction ranges
taking α into account are presented in the same way in the subsequent rows.
The lower and the upper bound derived when presuming α = 0 are symmetrically centered around
βc = 1, while the bounds derived when using the Fama-α are centered asymmetrically around βc =
1−α/µp, i.e. the hypothesized value of zero-profits from the static trading approach (Test 1). Note that
the latter bounds do not necessarily even contain the theoretical UIP value of unity. In particular,
the results based on the bounds calculated with α = 0 suggest that zero Sharpe ratios are always
rejected and even indicate a significant violation of the lower bound for the JPY, pointing at an
economically significant Sharpe ratio. Incorporating the Fama-α into the assessment reveals that this
finding is spurious, since for no currency the β is found to be different from the center of the range and,
accordingly, βs are always within the inaction range bounds. The finding of whether β is within the
inaction range calculated with α = 0 or the Fama-α is summarized in the last three rows by indicating
whether β = βc is rejected (R.) or not rejected (N.) and whether β is inside (I.) or outside (O.) the
lower bound and the upper bound.
A similar picture evolves when looking at the carry-trade results in Table 4. The inaction range
bounds for α = 0 and the Fama-α respectively differ in level and shape resulting in an inaccurate
assessment of economic value if α is disregarded. When setting α = 0, zero Sharpe ratios are rejected
for all currencies, while this is only the case for CAD, GBP, and DEM-EUR when taking α into
account. With respect to the lower bound, the results with α = 0 indicate a violation of the lower
bound for the JPY thereby suggesting an economically significant Sharpe ratio. Taking account of the
Fama-α reveals that for none of the currencies β violates the inaction range bounds, again supporting
the importance of considering the regression constant when evaluating economic significance.
Our inaction range results for the static trading approach as well as the carry-trade are in favor of
our argument that disregarding α may lead to an inaccurate assessment of economic value. As we only
find pronounced evidence for the JPY in both cases, one might at a first glance be tempted to consider
this a JPY-specific phenomenon, though. One has to bear in mind, however, that the sample stretches
until September 2008 and hence out into the current crisis period in which carry-trade profitability has
been greatly reduced. As a consequence, for a given Sharpe ratio threshold of 0.5, economic significance
may not be found independent of whether inaction ranges are calculated accurately or not, but just
because of the low performance of carry-trades relative to the threshold itself. We therefore report
carry-trade inaction ranges using only data up to December 2005 in Table 5. The results based on
7Lyons (2001), p. 215, states “[...] I feel safe in asserting that there is limited interest at these major institutions in
allocating capital to strategies with Sharpe ratios below 0.5.”.
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α = 0 indicate a violation of the lower bound for three out of the five currencies: CAD, GBP, and
JPY. Taking account of the Fama-α reveals that for none of the currencies β violates the inaction
range bounds and hence - based on the threshold of 0.5 - one would not view bilateral carry-trades as
yielding economic value.
Our arguments are further strengthend by comparing results across different Sharpe ratio thresh-
olds. While we used the value of 0.5 proposed by Lyons (2001) as an anchor point, the particular choice
of threshold applied for judging economic value depends on a market participant’s risk appetite. We
calculate inaction range bounds for the static trading approach and the carry trade for a range of
Sharpe ratio thresholds for the full sample as well as using only data until the end of 2005. Figure 2
plots the number of currencies for which economic value is indicated for a given Sharpe ratio threshold
depending on whether bounds are calculated based on α = 0 (plotted in gray) or the Fama-α (black).
For both sample periods, the static trading approach results based on α = 0 indicate that economic
value is generated for at least three currencies up to a Sharpe ratio threshold of 0.3 and for one cur-
rency (JPY) even beyond 0.5. Accounting for α reveals that none of the Sharpe ratios is different from
zero. Analoguously, assessing the economic value of carry-trades by inaction ranges based on α = 0
suggests that Sharpe ratio thresholds of up to 0.8 can be outperformed. Accounting for α reveals that
none of the bilateral carry-trades provides economic value for Sharpe thresholds higher than 0.4.
The above results provide strong support for our predictions that disregarding α leads to an overes-
timation of profits for the static trading approach (Prediction 1) as well as the carry-trade (Prediction
2), hence to inaccurate inaction ranges, and consequently to an incorrect assessment of economic value.
8 Our findings suggest that Sharpe ratios from the static trading approach are zero and that carry-
trades do not provide economic value for thresholds larger than 0.4. These results are consistent with
the Lyons (2001) concept of limits to speculation and in line with the conclusion of Sarno et al. (2006)
that the forward bias in bilateral exchange rates is economically small. Recent research, however,
provides evidence that the performance of carry-trade strategies improves substantially when creat-
ing portfolios across currencies, see e.g. Burnside et al. (2008). Della Corte et al. (2008) show that
economic value can be generated by conditioning on the forward premium in dynamic multi-currency
portfolio strategies. To supplement these findings, we present empirical results for the economic value
of carry-trade portfolios in the next subsection.
6.1.3 Economic Value of Carry-Trade Portfolios
As described in section 5.3, we estimate inaction ranges for an equally weighted portfolio and a Sharpe
ratio maximizing portfolio based on a pooled regression approach and a fixed effects model. The upper
part of Table 6 reports model estimates of α and β for the full sample and for the sample until end
of 2005. p[FE vs. pooled] is the p-value for the F-statistic of testing whether the pooled regression
model performs equally well as the fixed effects model; for both samples we find that the fit of the fixed
effects model is significantly better. The lower part of the table reports the inaction ranges for the
8As mentioned in Prediction 2, disregarding α when assessing the economic value of carry-trades also leads to an
underestimation of the variance of profits; empirically this effect is relatively small, though.
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two portfolios calculated with the Fama-α. In general, the portfolio inaction ranges based on a Sharpe
ratio threshold of 0.5 are tighter than those reported for bilateral carry-trades above which reflects the
better risk-return profile of the portfolios. The results based on the pooled regression model indicate
that profits of both portfolios are economically significant as judged by a Sharpe ratio threshold of 0.5.
The results of the fixed effects model suggest that economic value is only generated by the optimal
portfolio. As the F-statistics clearly indicate that the fixed effects model dominates the pool regression
approach, we concentrate on the former in our subsequent analysis.
To analyze the economic value attainable from carry-trade portfolios and the consequences of
disregarding α, we plot Sharpe ratio thresholds against the p-values at which they are outperformed
significantly in Figure 3. With Sharpe ratio thresholds along the the x-axis and corresponding p-vales
along the y-axis, the upper line represents p-values when accounting for α, the lower line represents
p-values when presuming α = 0. The plots show that the p-value for a given Sharpe ratio threshold is
much lower when disregarding α thereby indicating a too high level of economic significance. The tables
below the graphs list the Sharpe ratio thresholds which are significantly outperformed at p-values of
0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, showing that disregarding α leads to an overestimation of Sharpe ratios by 0.53
to 0.59. Nevertheless, the results also show that the optimal portfolio generates economic value as
Sharpe ratios are significantly larger than 0.5. This finding is line with the results of Della Corte et al.
(2008) and with market evidence that carry-trade strategies are hugely popular among practiconers;
see e.g. Galati and Melvin (2004) who show that the use of carry-trades are key driver of the surge in
foreign exchange trading in recent years.
6.2 Robustness Checks
With respect to the robustness of our results we examine whether our conclusions remain the same
when investigating other currencies, other forward-maturities, or other sample periods. These results
support the findings presented above and therefore, to save space, we prefer for most to just summarize
them instead of providing full tables. Detailed results are available upon request.
Apart from the currencies reported in the paper, we have also analyzed a variety of others such
as the Australian Dollar and New Zealand Dollar (which have been excluded because of short data
availability), other European non-Euro currencies (e.g. Norwegian Krone, Swedish Krone), and further
European pre-Euro currencies (e.g. French Franc, Italian Lira). The conclusions that can be drawn
for these currencies are qualitatively equivalent to those reached in the paper.
Second, our conclusions are independent of the choice of forward rate maturity. The Bank for
International Settlements also provides data for three, six, and twelve month horizons.9 Repeating the
analysis for this data, results are qualitatively the same.
Finally, our findings are robust over time. We did the whole empirical analysis on various subsam-
ples and conclusions are qualitatively the same; these results are omitted from the paper to save space
but are available on request. To provide further evidence for the relevance of considering α in the
9In the context of analyzing different maturities, it is worth mentioning that carry-trades are typically based on (rolling
over) short-term contracts since liquidity is higher than for longer maturities.
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assessment of economic value, we graph the Fama-β as well as the inaction ranges based on α = 0 and
the Fama-α for the carry-trade in Figure 4. The plots are based on 60-month rolling estimates using a
Sharpe ratio threshold of 0.5. The graphs illustrate that disregarding α distorts the evaluation of the
economic significance of speculation profits. While the rolling Fama-βs often seem to undershoot the
lower bound when calculating the inaction range with α = 0, this is merely true when accurately tak-
ing account of the Fama-α. This suggests that our conclusions of limited economic value for bilateral
carry-trades is not particular to the sample period chosen.
Figure 5 plots the inaction range bounds for the equally-weighted and the Sharpe ratio maximizing
portfolio estimated with the fixed effects model using α = 0 and the Fama-α respectively. The resulting
pictures are similar to those of the bilateral carry-trade in that the shape of the bounds accounting
for α looks very different from those based on disregarding α. For the latter the β undershoots the
lower bound by far most of the time for both portfolios. Based on the bounds that account for α, the
rolling β is very close to the lower bound and often inside the inaction range for the equally-weighted
portfolio. For the optimal portfolio, β is outside the inaction range most of the time, pointing at the
potential to generate economic value, however, at a lower scale as suggested by the bounds based on
α = 0. Hence, the robustness checks support our findings and strengthen our conclusions.
6.3 Summary of Results and Routes for Future Research
Our empirical results strongly support that UIP holds in a speculative sense and that exchange rate
dynamics comprise a time-varying risk-premium in addition to the forward premium. The forward bias
puzzle reported in previous research originates from the omission of this risk-premium in standard UIP
tests. While the carry-trade strategy collects risk-premia, its economic value is small on a bilateral
basis, however, carry-trade portfolios have the potential to generate economic value. Disregarding α
leads to overstating the economic value of currency speculation. Overall, our results are in line with
recent research and consistent with market evidence that financial institutions routinely apply forward
bias strategies.
A particularly nice feature of the framework developed in our paper is that it can be directly
applied to the standard Fama-regression setup. Hence, it equips the large research community working
on related studies with an effective testing procedure which is straight-forward in its implementation
and provides material information about the economic relevance of UIP deviations. Moreover, there
are various directions in which one can extend the analysis of the paper: A possible extension - which
was beyond the scope of the present paper - is to explicitly model the stochastic process of interest
rates. As the risk-premium that emerges from our model is driven by the current and the long-run
forward premium, it seems instructive to revisit multi-country term-structure models along the lines
of e.g. Bansal (1997), Backus et al. (2001), and Brennan and Xia (2006). Another extension could be
to model α and β as time-varying coefficients which allows for a closer look at the relationship between
the two parameters. Finally, the approach developed in this paper is not limited in its applicability
to foreign exchange markets. The same idea can be extended to other markets for which a standard
approach is to test expectations hypotheses or unbiasedness hypotheses. For instance, the same setting
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could be applied to (the closed economy) expectations hypothesis of interest rates potentially allowing
for explanations to departures from the expectations hypothesis.
7 Conclusion
Tests of foreign exchange market efficiency are typically based on an assessment of uncovered interest
rate parity (UIP) using the Fama-regression. Empirical research over the last decades consistently
rejects the UIP condition and claims that the forward rate is a biased estimate of the future spot rate.
Attempts to explain this forward bias puzzle, using a variety of (macro-oriented) models, tests, and
data, have met with limited success. Recent (microstructure-motivated) research finds that order-flow
drives exchange rates which suggests that scrutinizing the trading behavior of market participants may
offer deeper insight into the nature and the economic relevance of the forward bias puzzle. Traders
take up currency speculation strategies, and thereby produce order-flow, only if they expect resulting
profits to provide economic value; otherwise they remain inactive and the unexploited forward bias
may remain persistent.
In the present paper, we derived the dynamics and assessed the economic value of currency spec-
ulation by formalizing the concept of a trader inaction range. We derived a speculative pendant
to the standard UIP condition and showed (i) that exchange rate returns comprise a time-varying
risk-premium, (ii) how carry-traders are able to collect this risk-premium, thereby providing a direct
rationale for the strategy, and (iii) that the forward bias puzzle originates from the omission of the
risk-premium in standard UIP tests. Throughout our analysis, we emphasized that focusing on the
slope coefficient but disregarding the interecept in the Fama-regression leads to overestimating excess
returns and consequently to overstating the economic value of currency speculation.
Our empirical results strongly support that UIP holds in a speculative sense and that exchange rate
dynamics comprise a time-varying risk-premium, the omission of which causes the forward bias in the
Fama-regression. Carry-traders generate positive excess returns as predicted. Whereas the economic
value of these excess returns is limited for bilateral carry-trades, multi-currency portfolio strategies
indeed generate economic value. Overall, our results are in line with recent research and consistent
with market evidence that financial institutions routinely apply forward bias strategies.
A particularly nice feature of our framework is that it can be directly applied to the standard
Fama-regression setup. Hence, it equips the large research community working on related studies with
an effective testing procedure which is straight-forward in its implementation and provides material
information about the economic relevance of UIP deviations. Moreover, we have discussed various
directions in which one can extend the analysis of our paper in future research, also beyond foreign
exchange markets.
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Table 1: Uncovered Interest Parity
CAD CHF GBP JPY DEM-EUR
Fama-regression
α −0.0006 0.0056 −0.0033 0.0100 0.0021
(0.0010) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0020)
β −0.9858 −1.2915 −2.1322 −2.4954 −1.0907
(0.4728) (0.7288) (1.0570) (0.7205) (0.7979)
Standard UIP Tests
p[α = 0] [0.5510] [0.0457] [0.0797] [0.0002] [0.2996]
p[β = 1] [0.0000] [0.0018] [0.0032] [0.0000] [0.0092]
p[α = 0, β = 1] [0.0000] [0.0071] [0.0130] [0.0000] [0.0317]
Test 1 (Speculative UIP)
p[β = 1− αµp ] [0.3947] [0.7118] [0.2867] [0.7632] [0.8341]
Test 2 (Risk-Premia)
α1 −0.0006 0.0056 −0.0033 0.0100 0.0021
(0.0010) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0020)
−α2 −0.0013 0.0063 −0.0049 0.0106 0.0025
(0.0003) (0.002) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0009)
p[α1 = −α2] [0.3947] [0.7118] [0.2867] [0.7632] [0.8341]
p[α2 = 0] [0.0000] [0.0018] [0.0032] [0.0000] [0.0092]
Test 3 (CT Zero Profits)
p[β = 1− α′+ε′
p′
] [0.0011] [0.4955] [0.0239] [0.2536] [0.0437]
Notes: Results are for 09/1977-09/2008 for CAD, CHF, GBP, JPY, and 12/1978-09/2008 for the combined series of
DEM (until 12/1998) and EUR (from 01/1999). The table reports the Fama-regression estimates of α and β with
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors, following Newey and West (1987), in parentheses. µp
denotes the long run average of the forward premium. p[·] denotes the p-value for testing the hypothesis formulated in
[·]. The first three p-values are for standard hypotheses applied when testing UIP. Test 1 is the speculative UIP test that
we proposed in section 4.1. Results related to Test 2 are estimates of regression (8) with standard errors in parantheses
and p-values of relevant tests. Test 3 is applied to the Fama-regression (1) and investigates whether excess returns from
carry-trades are significantly different from zero. Superscript ′ indicates that a variable is adjusted for the position taken
in the strategy; see (12) in section 4.2. ε denotes the Fama-regression residual.
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Table 2: Dynamics of Currency Speculation
Panel A: Static Trading Approach (ER) and Perfect Foresight Strategy
CAD CHF GBP JPY DEM-EUR
Predicted sign vs. realized:
scenario 1a − −0.0065 −0.0075 −0.0043
scenario 2a + 0.0072 0.0056 0.0052
scenario 3a + 0.0032 0.0112 0.0060
scenario 4a − −0.0016 −0.0084
scenario 5a − −0.0012 −0.0010
scenario 6a + 0.0035 0.0072
Static long FC position:
mean 0.0007 −0.0007 0.0017 −0.0005 −0.0004
sd 0.0163 0.0358 0.0307 0.0341 0.0315
SR (p.a.) 0.1524 −0.0687 0.1877 −0.0554 −0.0407
Perfect foresight strategy:
mean 0.0024 0.0063 0.0054 0.0071 0.0049
sd 0.0161 0.0352 0.0302 0.0334 0.0312
SR (p.a.) 0.5203 0.6147 0.6231 0.7326 0.5413
Panel B: Carry-Trade (CT )
CAD CHF GBP JPY DEM-EUR
Predicted sign vs. realized:
scenario 1a + 0.0065 0.0075 0.0043
scenario 2a − −0.0072 −0.0056 −0.0052
scenario 3a + 0.0032 0.0112 0.0060
scenario 4a + 0.0016 0.0084
scenario 5a − −0.0012 −0.0010
scenario 6a + 0.0035 0.0072
Carry-Trade strategy:
mean 0.0019 0.0016 0.0048 0.0027 0.0038
sd 0.0162 0.0357 0.0303 0.0341 0.0313
SR (p.a.) 0.4122 0.1573 0.5513 0.2704 0.4165
Notes: Results are for 09/1977-09/2008 for CAD, CHF, GBP, JPY, and 12/1978-09/2008 for the combined series of DEM
(until 12/1998) and EUR (from 01/1999).
Panel A compares realized excess returns from the static trading approach (ER) to the signs predicted for scenarios 1a
to 6a; see section 4.1. Monthly mean and standard deviations as well as annualized Sharpe ratios are reported for a
permanent long position in the foreign currency as well as for the prefect foresight strategy.
Panel B compares realized carry-trade excess returns (CT ) to the signs predicted for scenarios 1a to 6a; see section 4.2.
Furthermore, monthly mean and standard deviations as well as annualized Sharpe ratios of carry-trades are reported.
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Table 3: Trader Inaction Ranges for the Static Trading Approach
CAD CHF GBP JPY DEM-EUR
Fama-regression
α −0.0006 0.0056 −0.0033 0.0100 0.0021
(0.0010) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0020)
β −0.9858 −1.2915 −2.1322 −2.4954 −1.0907
(0.4728) (0.7288) (1.057) (0.7205) (0.7979)
Bounds with α = 0
βu 4.7784 2.8733 3.8047 2.5900 4.9571
[1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000]
βc 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
[0.0000] [0.0018] [0.0032] [0.0000] [0.0092]
βl −2.7784 −0.8733 −1.8047 −0.5900 −2.9571
[0.9999] [0.2832] [0.3784] [0.0043] [0.9901]
Bounds with Fama-α
βu 3.8109 0.8181 1.6831 −0.7236 3.0361
[0.9996] [0.9987] [0.9999] [0.9986] [0.9957]
βc 0.1214 −1.0326 −1.0750 −2.3152 −0.7801
[0.3947] [0.7118] [0.2867] [0.7632] [0.8341]
βl −3.7723 −2.9844 −3.9836 −3.9872 −4.9705
[0.9675] [0.9888] [0.9630] [0.9919] [0.9875]
Inference α = 0/Fama-α
βu I. / I. I. / I. I. / I. I. / I. I. / I.
βc R. / N. R. / N. R. / N. R. / N. R. / N.
βl I. / I. I. / I. I. / I. O. / I. I. / I.
Notes: Results are for 09/1977-09/2008 for CAD, CHF, GBP, JPY, and 12/1978-09/2008 for the combined series of DEM
(until 12/1998) and EUR (from 01/1999). α and β are the estimates of the Fama-regression with heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors, following Newey and West (1987), in parentheses. Based on equation (17)
and a Sharpe ratio threshold of 0.5, the upper (βu) and lower (βl) bound as well as the center (βc) of the inaction range
for the static trading approach are calculated, first setting α = 0, second using α from the Fama regression. The values
in square brackets are the p-values for testing whether β is below βu, β equals βc, and β is above βl. The last three
rows summarize these findings by indicating whether the hypothesis of β = βc is rejected (R.) or not rejected (N.) and
whether β is inside (I.) or outside (O.) the lower bound and the upper bound when comparing the bounds calculated
with α = 0 or the Fama-α respectively.
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Table 4: Trader Inaction Ranges for Carry-Trades
CAD CHF GBP JPY DEM-EUR
Fama-regression
α −0.0006 0.0056 −0.0033 0.0100 0.0021
(0.0010) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0020)
β −0.9858 −1.2915 −2.1322 −2.4954 −1.0907
(0.4728) (0.7288) (1.057) (0.7205) (0.7979)
Bounds with α = 0
βu 2.5773 1.9724 3.4478 2.3521 2.8463
[1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000]
βc 0.7122 0.4256 1.2738 0.8646 0.9152
[0.0004] [0.0190] [0.0014] [0.0000] [0.0124]
βl −1.1734 −1.1581 −0.8810 −0.6309 −1.0211
[0.6541] [0.4274] [0.1186] [0.0050] [0.4653]
Bounds with Fama-α
βu 2.4302 0.7582 2.4381 −0.1690 2.4568
[1.0000] [0.9974] [1.0000] [0.9993] [1.0000]
βc 0.5643 −0.7943 0.2646 −1.6715 0.5240
[0.0011] [0.4955] [0.0239] [0.2536] [0.0437]
βl −1.3220 −2.4018 −1.9061 −3.2069 −1.4183
[0.7612] [0.9358] [0.4153] [0.8380] [0.6592]
Inference α = 0/Fama-α
βu I. / I. I. / I. I. / I. I. / I. I. / I.
βc R. / R. R. / N. R. / R. R. / N. R. / R.
βl I. / I. I. / I. I. / I. O. / I. I. / I.
Notes: Results are for 09/1977-09/2008 for CAD, CHF, GBP, JPY, and 12/1978-09/2008 for the combined series of DEM
(until 12/1998) and EUR (from 01/1999). α and β are the estimates of the Fama-regression with heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors, following Newey and West (1987), in parentheses. Based on equation (19)
and a Sharpe ratio threshold of 0.5, the upper (βu) and lower (βl) bound as well as the center (βc) of the inaction range
for the carry-trade are calculated, first setting α = 0, second using α from the Fama regression. The values in square
brackets are the p-values for testing whether β is below βu, β equals βc, and β is above βl. The last three rows summarize
these findings by indicating whether the hypothesis of β = βc is rejected (R.) or not rejected (N.) and whether β is inside
(I.) or outside (O.) the lower bound and the upper bound when comparing the bounds calculated with α = 0 or the
Fama-α respectively.
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Table 5: Trader Inaction Ranges for Carry-Trades until 12/2005
CAD CHF GBP JPY DEM-EUR
Fama-regression
α −0.0013 0.0054 −0.0042 0.0100 0.0018
(0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0022)
β −1.3714 −1.3316 −2.4778 −2.5434 −1.1993
(0.4144) (0.7338) (1.0639) (0.7374) (0.8051)
Bounds with α = 0
βu 2.7766 1.9294 3.5921 2.3921 3.0019
[1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000]
βc 1.0891 0.3960 1.4850 0.8517 1.0947
[0.0000] [0.0191] [0.0002] [0.0000] [0.0047]
βl −0.5920 −1.1762 −0.5892 −0.6975 −0.8068
[0.0304] [0.4162] [0.0384] [0.0064] [0.3131]
Bounds with Fama-α
βu 2.3803 0.8292 2.2907 −0.0801 2.6938
[1.0000] [0.9983] [1.0000] [0.9995] [1.0000]
βc 0.6902 −0.7100 0.1841 −1.6359 0.7857
[0.0000] [0.3975] [0.0128] [0.2193] [0.0142]
βl −0.9967 −2.3027 −1.9114 −3.2270 −1.1197
[0.1833] [0.9067] [0.2974] [0.8227] [0.4606]
Inference α = 0/Fama-α
βu I. / I. I. / I. I. / I. I. / I. I. / I.
βc R. / R. R. / N. R. / R. R. / N. R. / R.
βl O. / I. I. / I. O. / I. O. / I. I. / I.
Notes: Results are for 09/1977-12/2005 for CAD, CHF, GBP, JPY, and 12/1978-12/2005 for the combined series of DEM
(until 12/1998) and EUR (from 01/1999). α and β are the estimates of the Fama-regression with heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors, following Newey and West (1987), in parentheses. Based on equation (19)
and a Sharpe ratio threshold of 0.5, the upper (βu) and lower (βl) bound as well as the center (βc) of the inaction range
for the carry-trade are calculated, first setting α = 0, second using α from the Fama regression. The values in square
brackets are the p-values for testing whether β is below βu, β equals βc, and β is above βl. The last three rows summarize
these findings by indicating whether the hypothesis of β = βc is rejected (R.) or not rejected (N.) and whether β is inside
(I.) or outside (O.) the lower bound and the upper bound when comparing the bounds calculated with α = 0 or the
Fama-α respectively.
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Table 6: Model Estimates and Trader Inaction Ranges for Carry-Trade Portfolios
Sample: 09/1977-09/2008 Sample: 09/1977-12/2005
Pooled Fixed Effects Pooled Fixed Effects
Model Estimates
α 0.0018 0.0016
(0.0008) (0.0008)
αCAD −0.0010 −0.0015
(0.0009) (0.0009)
αCHF 0.0064 0.0065
(0.0022) (0.0023)
αGBP −0.0024 −0.0029
(0.0016) (0.0017)
αJPY 0.0073 0.0075
(0.0021) (0.0022)
αDEM−EUR 0.0027 0.0024
(0.0018) (0.0020)
β −0.7774 −1.5914 −0.8743 −1.7223
(0.2935) (0.3803) (0.3000) (0.3858)
p[FE vs. pooled] [0.0008] [0.0006]
Portfolio Bounds:
Equally-Weighted
βu 1.4237 I. 0.6096 I. 1.5479 I. 0.6999 I.
[1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000]
βc 0.3848 R. −0.4292 R. 0.5202 R. −0.3278 R.
[0.0000] [0.0023] [0.0000] [0.0003]
βl −0.6668 O. −1.4808 I. −0.5163 O. −1.3643 I.
[0.0076] [0.3856] [0.0009] [0.1768]
Portfolio Bounds:
Max. Sharpe Ratio
βu 1.6622 I. 0.8482 I. 1.8105 I. 0.9625 I.
[1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000] [1.0000]
βc 0.8082 R. −0.0059 R. 0.9785 R. 0.1305 R.
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
βl −0.0551 O. −0.8691 O. 0.1411 O. −0.7069 O.
[0.0000] [0.0288] [0.0000] [0.0043]
Notes: Results are for the sample periods indicated in the column headers. Estimates for the pooled regression model
and the fixed effects model as described in section 5.3 are reported in the columns corresponding to their labels with
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors, following Newey and West (1987), in parentheses. p[FE
vs. pooled] is the p-value for the F-statistic for equal model performance. Based on equation (19) and a Sharpe ratio
threshold of 0.5, the upper (βu) and lower (βl) bound as well as the center (βc) of the inaction range are calculated for the
equally-weighted carry-trade portfolio and for the Sharpe ratio maximizing portfolio which are constructed as described
in section 5.3. The values in square brackets are the p-values for testing whether β is below βu, β equals βc, and β is
above βl. The letters right to the estimated bounds summarize these findings by indicating whether the hypothesis of
β = βc is rejected (R.) or not rejected (N.) and whether β is inside (I.) or outside (O.) the lower bound and the upper
bound.
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Figure 1: Composition of Average Excess Returns (ER)
CAD CHF GBP JPY DEM-EUR
ER-components: absolute
α −0.0006 0.0056 −0.0033 0.0100 0.0021
(β − 1)µp 0.0013 −0.0063 0.0049 −0.0106 −0.0025
ER-components: relative
[%]α −30.67% 47.01% −39.85% 48.68% 45.99%
[%](β − 1)µp 69.33% −52.99% 60.15% −51.32% −54.01%
Testing (β − 1)p1t = 0
t-stat 8.6268 −17.8661 14.8780 −25.4508 −8.8428
Notes: This Figure summarizes the composition of average excess returns ER = α+(β−1)µp as in (3).
Results are for 09/1977-09/2008 for CAD, CHF, GBP, JPY, and 12/1978-09/2008 for the combined
series of DEM (until 12/1998) and EUR (from 01/1999). The plot shows a stacked column diagram
that visualizes the composition of average excess returns, ER, based on the values reported in the
tabular below the graph. The t-statistics in the last row are for testing the null hypothesis that the
mean of the series of (β − 1)p1t is equal to zero.
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Figure 2: Sharpe Ratio Thresholds and Economic Significance
Sample: 09/1977-09/2008
Static Trading Approach Carry-Trade
Sample: 09/1977-12/2005
Static Trading Approach Carry-Trade
Notes: The columns plot the number of currencies for which a given Sharpe ratio threshold (x-axis)
is outperformed significantly as judged by trader inaction ranges calculated with α = 0 (columns in
gray) and the Fama-α (black) respectively. Overall, five currencies are included: CAD, CHF, GBP,
JPY, and the merged series of DEM and EUR. Inaction ranges are calculated for the Static Trading
Approach as described in section 4.1 (on the left) and the carry-trade as described in section 4.2 (on
the right). The respective data samples are as indicated in the headers of the plots; for the DEM-EUR
data is available only from 12/1978.
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Figure 3: Sharpe Ratio Thresholds and Economic Significance: Carry-Trade Portfolios
Sample: 09/1977-09/2008
Equally-Weighted Portfolio Optimal Portfolio
p-value SRth[α] SRth[α = 0]
0.01 0.14 0.67
0.05 0.26 0.79
0.10 0.32 0.86
p-value SRth[α] SRth[α = 0]
0.01 0.41 0.95
0.05 0.56 1.10
0.10 0.63 1.18
Sample: 09/1977-12/2005
Equally-Weighted Portfolio Optimal Portfolio
p-value SRth[α] SRth[α = 0]
0.01 0.24 0.79
0.05 0.37 0.91
0.10 0.43 0.98
p-value SRth[α] SRth[α = 0]
0.01 0.57 1.16
0.05 0.72 1.31
0.10 0.81 1.39
Notes: Graphs on the left are for the equally-weighted carry-trade portfolio, on the right for the optimal
portfolio maximizing the Sharpe ratio. The graphs plot Sharpe ratio thresholds against the p-values
at which they are outperformed significantly. With Sharpe ratio thresholds along the the x-axis and
corresponding p-values along the y-axis, the upper line represents p-values when accounting for α, the
lower line represents p-values when presuming α = 0. The tables below the graphs list the Sharpe
ratio thresholds which are significantly outperformed at p-values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1. The respective
data samples are as indicated in the headers of the plots; for the DEM-EUR data is available only
from 12/1978.
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Figure 4: Trader Inaction Ranges for the Carry-Trade
Bounds with α = 0 Bounds with Fama-α
CAD
CHF
GBP
JPY
DEM-
EUR
Notes: The graphs show the 60-month rolling Fama-β estimates for the exchange rates USD against
the indicated foreign currency and the corresponding trader inaction ranges for the carry-trade. The
inaction range bounds are calculated with α = 0 (left) and the Fama-α (right) respectively, see equation
(19). The underlying Sharpe ratio threshold is 0.5.
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Figure 5: Trader Inaction Ranges for Carry-Trade Portfolios
Equally-Weighted Carry-Trade Portfolios
Fixed Effects, with α = 0 Fixed Effects, with Fama-α
Optimal Carry-Trade Portfolios
Fixed Effects, with α = 0 Fixed Effects, with Fama-α
Notes: The graphs show the 60-month rolling Fama-β estimates of the fixed effects model for the
equally-weighted and the Sharpe ratio maximizing carry-trade portfolios and their corresponding trader
inaction ranges. The inaction range bounds are calculated with α = 0 (left) and the Fama-α (right)
respectively, see equation (19). The underlying Sharpe ratio threshold is 0.5.
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Appendix (additional material, not necessarily to be published)
Appendix A. Unconditional (Country) Risk-Premium
There might be reasons for the unconditional expectation of ER to be non-zero, in particular, if the
currencies considered are related to countries with different levels of risk. For instance, one country may
be considered as a safe heaven as compared to the other, or one country is experiencing a transition.
The framework outlined in section 4.1 does also allow to account for a corresponding unconditional
country risk-premium. Let γ denote the unconditional expectation of the country risk-premium (which
might either be positive or negative), then the average excess return is given by
ER = α+ (β − 1)µp = γ. (20)
Analogously to section 4.1, we rearrange this expression in terms of the Fama-regression slope coeffi-
cient
β = 1− α− γ
µp
(21)
and impose this restriction on the regression 1. The dynamics of excess returns are then given by
ERt+1 = α− (α− γ) p
1
t
µp
+ εt+1 (22)
which can again be empirically tested by estimating
ERt+1 = α1 + α
γ
2
p1t
µp
+ εt+1 (23)
If αγ2 is significantly different from zero this would again provide evidence for a time-varying risk
component as motivated in this paper. However, in the presence of a country risk-premium, one does
not expect to find that α1 = −αγ2 . In fact, if one proceeds as described in section 4.1 and in Test
2 , see (8), that α1 6= −α2, this is an indication for an unconsidered country risk-premium. Note
that the procedure just described of course also nests a constant risk-premium as discussed in the
traditional literature when testing the restriction β = 1 but expecting α 6= 0. In our framework this
would correspond to γ = α leading to
∆st+1 = α+ p1t + εt+1 (24)
Appendix B. Sharpe Ratios and Trader Inaction Ranges
This appendix summarizes the properties of Sharpe ratios and trader inaction ranges for the static
trading approach. Section B.1. reports technical details when α is disregarded, i.e. presumed to zero,
section B.2. for calculations based on the Fama-α. We abstain from presenting analogous derivations
for the carry-trade approach, since the details are lengthy but straightforward along the arguments for
the static trading approach.
B.1. Sharpe Ratio and Inaction Range Bounds when α = 0
1
Sharpe Ratio with α = 0: Based on equation (16) we investigate the Sharpe ratio when α = 0,
SR =
(β − 1) p√
(β − 1)2σ2p + σ2ε
.
The first derivative of the Sharpe ratio with respect to β is given by
∂SR
∂β
=
µpσ
2
ε[
σ2ε + (β − 1)2 σ2p
]3/2 ,
i.e. depending on the sign of µp, the Sharpe ratio increases (µp > 0) or decreases (µp < 0) monotoni-
cally.The second derivative,
∂2SR
∂β2
= − 3 (β − 1)µpσ
2
εσ
2
p[
σ2ε + (β − 1)2 σ2p
]5/2 ,
shows that, if µp > 0, the Sharpe ratio function is concave (∂
2SR
∂β2
< 0) for β > 1, while it is convex
(∂
2SR
∂β2
> 0) for β < 1. The reverse is true if µp < 0.Calculating the limits of the Sharpe ratio function
with β going to plus and minus infinity reveals that the Sharpe ratio is bounded:
lim
β→∞
SR =
µp
√
σ2p
σ2p
and lim
β→−∞
SR = −
µp
√
σ2p
σ2p
.
Inaction Range Bounds with α = 0: Based on equation (15) we investigate the inaction range
for UIP deviations when setting α = 0,
β [SRth, α = 0] =
±SRthσε√(
µ2p − SR2thσ2p
) + 1.
To investigate the shape of the inaction range bounded by a upper β, βu and a lower β, βl, we look
at the derivatives with respect to the Sharpe ratio threshold, SRth,
upper bound:
∂βu
∂SRth
=
µ2pσε[
µ2p − σ2pSR2th
]3/2 > 0 and ∂2βu∂SR2th = 3µ
2
pσεσ
2
pSRth[
µ2p − σ2pSR2th
]5/2 > 0,
lower bound:
∂βl
∂SRth
= − µ
2
pσε[
µ2p − σ2pSR2th
]3/2 < 0 and ∂2βl∂SR2th = − 3µ
2
pσεσ
2
pSRth[
µ2p − σ2pSR2th
]5/2 < 0.
Thus, the upper bound is an increasing convex function of the Sharpe ratio threshold, while the lower
bound is decreasing and concave.
B.2. Sharpe Ratio and Inaction Range Bounds when using the Fama-α
Sharpe Ratio with Fama-α: In order to investigate the change in the Sharpe ratio when incorpo-
rating the Fama-α instead of setting α = 0, we look at the partial derivatives:
∂SR
∂α
=
1√
σ2ε + (β − 1)2σ2p
,
∂2SR
∂α2
= 0.
2
Hence, depending on the sign of α, the Sharpe ratio changes inversely proportional to the standard
deviation.Looking at the partial derivatives of the Sharpe ratio with respect to β,
∂SR
∂β
=
µpσ
2
ε − α(β − 1)σ2p[
σ2ε + (β − 1)2 σ2p
]3/2 ,
∂2SR
∂β2
= −3 (β − 1)µpσ
2
εσ
2
p + ασ
2
p[σ
2
ε − 2(β − 1)2σ2p][
σ2ε + (β − 1)2 σ2p
]5/2 ,
reveals that the function is non-monotonic. While the Sharpe ratio is still bounded with the same
limits as given above, the global optimum, i.e. ∂SR/∂β = 0, is not reached with β going to plus or
minus infinity but when β = (µpσε)/(ασp) + 1.
Inaction Range Bounds with Fama-α: To investigate the impact of including α in the assess-
ment of economic significance, we consider the partial derivatives of the inaction range bounds with
respect to α:
upper bound:
∂βu
∂α
=
−µp + ασ
2
pSRth√
α2 σ2p+σ
2
ε(µ2p−σ2pSR2th)
µ2p − σ2pSR2th
and
∂2βu
∂α2
=
σ2εσ
2
pSRth[
σ2ε(µ2p − σ2pSR2th) + α2σ2p
]3/2 > 0,
lower bound:
∂βl
∂α
=
−µp − ασ
2
pSRth√
α2 σ2p+σ
2
ε(µ2p−σ2pSR2th)
µ2p − σ2pSR2th
and
∂2βl
∂α2
= − σ
2
εσ
2
pSRth[
σ2ε(µ2p − σ2pSR2th) + α2σ2p
]3/2 < 0,
indicating that a non-zero α affects the level as well as the shape of the inaction range.
Appendix C. Testing Inaction Range Bounds
To test whether β significantly overshoots the upper bound or undershoots the lower bound, we use
the nonlinear analog to the F statistic; see e.g. Greene (2003) p.175ff. The general specification
F [J, n−K] = [S(b∗)− S(b)]/J
S(b)/(n−K) (25)
where b∗ denotes the estimates obtained when the hypothesis is imposed and b denotes the unrestricted
estimates. J is the number of restrictions, n the number of observations, K the number of parameters.
S(·) denotes sum of squared residuals of the estimation with b∗ and b respectively. The test statistic
is (approximately) F -distributed with [J, n−K] degrees of freedom.
One could also use a Wald test which might be simpler to compute. However, as also for the
linear case, the Wald statistic is not invariant to how hypotheses are formulated, potentially leading
to different answers depending on the specification of the hypothesis. Furthermore, Greene (2003) p.
176 states that “the small-sample behavior of W can be erratic, and the more conservative F statistic
may be preferable if the sample is not large”.
3
To judge whether β overshoots the upper bound βu, we want to obtain the probability that β
is within the inaction range, i.e. whether β < βu. Since our F -Test has one numerator degree of
freedom, the square-root of the F -statistic corresponds to the absolute value of the t-statistic for the
one-sided test. Taking the sign of the estimate into account, the probability that β is below βu is
therefore given by the reverse cumulative t-distribution for sgn[β − βu]√F[J,n−k] with (n− k) degrees
of freedom. If this probability is below our confidence level threshold, we reject the hypothesis and
say that β overshoots the upper bound. For the lower bound we proceed analogously.
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